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4.1. Introduction
Sustainable growth, in addition to smart growth and inclusive growth, is one 
of the three key priorities in the EU2020S. It is understood as promoting a 
resource-efficient economy which would be more eco-friendly and more 
competitive than in the 20th century. Therefore growth, defined in this way, is 
closer to the concept of development, although it is worth emphasising that 
development would be impossible without economic growth. For these rea-
sons, economic growth continues to be one of the major objectives of various 
strategic documents drawn up at the EU, national, regional and urban level.
The socio-economic changes taking place in the world today which result 
from the processes of globalisation and integration of the global economy, 
require a new approach to economic growth. One such example is the compet-
itiveness between the individual subjects, which is perceived as the main driv-
ing force of development, and which is the result of uniform global demand, 
gradual elimination of transfer barriers, uniform standards and norms, as well 
as progress in ITC technologies (Wdowicka, 2008).
The terms “competitiveness” and “competition” have been known for 
a long time, both in theory and in economic practices. The term “economic 
competitiveness” is used to refer to enterprises, industries, municipalities, re-
gions and whole national economies. Simply speaking “competition” can be 
defined as a process of rivalry between economic entities seeking to achieve 
similar goals (Stankiewicz, 2001). The term competitive enterprise does not 
raise many controversies, as opposed to evaluating the competitiveness of 
a city, region or country, which probably stems from the different nature of 
competition (Golińska-Pieszyńska, 2008).
Competitiveness of the national economy is determined by the ability 
to create more wealth than that created by competitors in the global market. 
This ability results from the process of transforming the resources of a given 
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country (mostly natural resources) through economic processes (e.g. manu-
facturing), into economic effects (Jodkowski, 1995). The level of competitive-
ness is determined mainly by: (1) economic potential, (2) internationalisation 
of the economy, (3) economic policy, (4) financial system, (5) infrastructure 
equipment, (6) management, (7) the scientific and technological level and (8) 
human capital (Wdowicka, 2008).
The competitiveness of cities and regions is usually defined as the ability 
to adapt to the changing conditions, while paying special attention to main-
taining or improving one’s position in the ongoing rivalry between regions 
and cities (Komorowski, 2000; Chmielewski and Trojanek, 1999; Cybulski, 
1999; Winiarski, 1999). This changeability is a distinctive feature of the con-
temporary world and it mainly concerns economic issues, such as the global 
crisis which has been present since 2008, but also social, cultural, political 
and technical issues as well. Rivalry takes place above all over: reaching a 
higher level of development, the importance in terms of space, having access 
to external benefits, financial resources, attracting the most efficient and most 
dynamic companies, investors or institutions, and human capital (Wdowic-
ka, 2008). The measure of competitiveness is the ability to make use of the 
available production factors, and on their basis form such economic structures 
which will guarantee long-term and effective development to ensure a high 
level of income (Wdowicka, 2008; Klamut and Passella, 1999).
Worth noticing is the approach to competitiveness presented in the studies 
of the European Commission, where a competitive European economy is one, 
in which the society can maintain a growing standard of living, assuming of 
course that the balance of payments and the welfare of future generations are 
not threatened (Radło, 2003). This definition, therefore, emphasises the rising 
standard of living (wealth and also the level of prosperity of the population) 
and the welfare of future generations, which refers to the need for sustainable 
growth. Therefore, there is no doubt that the levels of economic growth and 
competitiveness are strongly connected to each other. 
Since the beginning of economic sciences, there have been attempts to 
explain the phenomenon of unequal distribution of wealth in an economy and 
the reasons for these widening disparities, despite simultaneous increase in 
the absolute standards of living due to technological progress. The analysis 
of regional disparities of economic growth can be categorised as one of the 
main research trends within the framework of geography, and regional ge-
ography in particular. There are a number of different theories and models 
which attempt to explain the geographical diversification of economic growth 
and prosperity of societies. One example is F. Perroux’s growth pole theory 
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which states that there are certain areas which are particularly privileged and 
favourable because of their conditions of development called centres or poles 
of growth, and areas which are still in a much worse situation (Parysek, 2006; 
Hermansen, 1974; Klaassen, 1974).
 Another theory which attempts to explain the different levels of regional 
development is Friedmann’s (1967) core and periphery model. This model is 
an outline of the spatial structure of the regional system based on the assump-
tion of unequal development, and it describes the nature of the relative loca-
tion of rich and poor regions in a given system. The main components of the 
regional system in this model are the core regions, which are characterized by 
high levels of socio-economic development, and the peripheral regions, which 
are adjacent to the core regions, yet they represent a low level of development. 
This perspective corresponds to Boudeville’s concept of polarised regions, 
which lies within the category of nodal regions (Czyż, 2002).
The transformation processes which have been taking place in Central 
Europe after the enlargement of the EU in 2004, seem to confirm the conclu-
sions of the “centre-periphery” model according to which Western Europe 
is an attractive “centre” of economic and cultural strength which attracts 
“peripheries”, i.e. the less developed countries in the immediate vicinity and 
those further away. The driving force of the EU’s enlargement process is the 
assumption that membership in the integration group, naturally creates fa-
vourable conditions for reducing development disparities. This, in particular, 
results from the fact that the primary objective of the European Union is to 
equalize the level of development of its individual members. The convergence 
hypothesis suggests that under favourable conditions economic development 
in different countries may even out (Ptaszyńska, 2008).
In this paper the analysis focuses on differences and changes in the lev-
el of economic development and competitiveness of the EU member states 
and regions at the time of the world economic crisis. The crisis, triggered by 
the collapse of the subprime mortgage lending in the United States, started a 
heavy financial and banking crisis also in other parts of the world, including 
Europe, and spread on to other sectors of the economy.
4.2. Gross Domestic Product per Capita
One of the main indicators which shows the level of regional development and 
the wealth of societies is GDP per capita in pps eliminating the differences in 
price levels between countries, according to EUROSTAT regular calculations. 
It also enables to make interregional comparisons which are particularly rele-
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vant when implementing the EU cohesion policy (convergence) and building 
European competitiveness in the global arena. 
When analysing the spatial distribution of GDP per capita in pps in 2009, 
a division is evident between the East and the West which remarkably fol-
lows the Iron Curtain pre-1989 (Map 4.1). The poorest regions are located in 
Eastern countries such as Bulgaria, Romania or Macedonia, where GDP per 
capita in PPS is 50% or less of the EU27 average. The fact that most of these 
Eastern countries are now members or candidate countries of the EU provides 
an opportunity for closing the gap with Western Europe. These are mostly 
countries of the former so-called Eastern Bloc, where the communist regime 
and the ideology of socialism acted as a brake on economic and social devel-
opment, and whose economies, which operated within a command-and-quota 
system were, and still are difficult to adapt to the requirements of free market 
economy. The mentality of people brought up on the ideology of real social-
ism is probably not without significance. According to the Friedmann’s (1967) 
theory, this area can be included to the periphery of EU.
The highest level of economic development and prosperity of the popu-
lation in relation to the average of the EU27 in 2009 is represented mainly by 
regions of Western countries of the EU, in particular, the sparsely populated 
regions of norway, which in fact, is not a member of the EU, some big and 
medium-sized metropolitan regions of central Europe and the predominantly 
moderate mountainous regions of the Alps, but also the regions of Western 
Germany and the Benelux countries, where GDP per capita in PPS is higher 
than 125% of the EU27 average. The richest regions in the EU27countries 
and EU candidate countries are the metropolitan regions in highly developed 
countries, such as: (1) the United Kingdom, where the Inner West London 
region has the highest level of economic growth and prosperity of the popu-
lation of almost 6 times higher than the EU27 average; (2) Germany, where 
there are as many as 5 out of the 10 most developed regions in the EU27 (Mu-
nich, Frankfurt am Main, Düsseldorf, Schweinfurt, Regensburg); (3) France, 
where a particularly high level of economic growth is represented by the fol-
lowing regions: Hauts-de-Seine and Paris; and (4) Luxemburg. These are all 
regions where there are numerous universities, research and developmental 
centres, technological parks and financial institutions. It is these regions that 
increasingly develop their economy based on knowledge, and since they offer 
a high standard of living they attract the creative class, which today is regard-
ed as one of the most important factors of urban development (Stryjakiewicz, 
2010; Kopel, 2007; Florida, 2005). Metropolitan regions can be treated as 
growth poles of the EU.
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Map 4.1. Regional GDP per head measured as purchasing power standard in 
percentage of the EU average (EU=100), 2009.
The spatial distribution of the highly developed regions refers to the so-called 
European Banana (Blue Banana, Hot Banana), which was identified in the 90s 
of the 20th century, and stretched from England through the Benelux countries, 
Western Germany, Switzerland to northern Italy. This area can be treated as 
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the core of EU development. In addition, other nearby regions to this “blue 
banana” are wealthy in comparative terms, for instance the north-East quarter 
of Spain (all of them above the 100% average of EU27) or particular parts 
of Ireland or Scotland, these latter denoting that not necessarily a peripheral 
location means lower economic levels. Apart from the urban character of 
regions, significant and positive correlations can be traced between those 
regions being in a better situation in economic terms and the specialisation 
in scientific, technological, ICT and financial activities. This shows that the 
development of advanced services explains a wealthier status and that this 
might be the appropriate strategy for the regions lagging behind. 
4.3.  Growth Measured as Gross Domestic Product per Capita Variation
A somewhat different situation can be observed looking at the map presenting 
changing in GDP per capita (expressed as a percentage) in 2000-2009. To a 
large extent, it illustrates how individual regions were affected by fluctuations 
in the global economic situation, or how well they coped at the beginning of 
the crisis, which is still going on. One notable aspect is a clear division into 
two groups (Map 4.2):
- The first group includes Eastern countries, most notably Romania, 
whose regions displayed a very dynamic growth of GDP per capi-
ta (some regions even doubled the pace of economic growth in the 
examined period), and Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, 
Slovakia, Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic. With few exceptions, 
these managed to achieve economic growth. It should be noted that 
the countries are newcomers to the EU and in most cases use their 
own currencies rather than the euro.
- The other group of states is all the remaining ones in the examined 
area, i.e. all EU states not listed above, where GDP per capita chang-
es in 2000-2009 were minor or negative. The most seriously affect-
ed regions were located in Central and Western Europe, in particu-
lar in France, Italy, and Greece, but also the UK, Ireland, Sweden, 
Belgium, the netherlands, Denmark, Portugal, Austria and Germany. 
The group includes mostly well developed economies, including Eu-
rozone members.
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Map 4.2. Change in regional GDP per head measured as purchasing power 
standard in percentage of the EU average (EU=100), 2000-2009.
Among the ten most dynamically developing European regions in 2000-
2009 as many as seven were regions of Romania. The highest rate of eco-
nomic growth was recorded for the Romanian regions of Ilfov (228.57%), 
and Timiş, Sibiu, Prahova, Argeş, Brăila, and Giurgiu, for Southern Ostro-
bothnia in Finland, and for the South-Western Region and Sofia City in Bul-
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garia. In all these regions GDP per capita grew by at least 100%. The regions 
most hit by the crisis were ones commonly considered to be economically 
well-developed, including Pirkanmaa in Finland, with the most severe neg-
ative growth of GDP per capita, amounting to -67.97%; Arrondissement of 
Virton in Belgium, Leverkusen; Heilbronn in Germany; Powys, Swindon, 
Coventry and Sefton in the United Kingdom; and Korinthia and Voiotia in 
Greece. The growth of GDP per capita there was negative and amounted to 
less than -25%. 
The clear trend of several of the regions in less developed member states 
to converge, together with the fact that disparities are slowly being reduced, 
is an indicator that territorial cohesion is occurring. However, the uncertainty 
around the EU cohesion policy post-2013 poses major threats to this trajec-
tory.
4.4. Labour Productivity
An important factor determining both the efficiency and competitiveness of the 
economy is labour productivity. Improving labour productivity in individual 
regions, as well as attracting investors is attributed to the fundamental impor-
tance of improving economic performance and helping underdeveloped regions 
catch up (Laissy, 2008). However, this requires the ability to use the synergy 
that exists between labour productivity and labour quality, and the level of em-
ployment.
When analysing the spatial distribution of labour productivity in European 
regions in 2008, certain regularity can be easily noticed (Map 4.3). Thus not 
surprisingly an overall East/West divide (with the former in a worse situation 
that the latter) is perceptible. In addition, both share higher levels in metropol-
itan and urban than in rural areas. In the Eastern part there are regions of very 
low labour productivity (less than 50% of the EU27 average) and low labour 
productivity (50-75% of the EU27 average). These are generally regions of the 
countries which joined the EU in 2004 or later and the candidate countries. The 
worst situation is in the Eastern regions of Poland, Turkey, and in almost all of 
Romania and Bulgaria. The situation is slightly better in this respect in Lithua-
nia, Latvia, Estonia, in the Western regions of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slo-
vakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Macedonia and the Western regions of Turkey. Only 
some regions of this part of Europe have obtained an average level of labour 
productivity (75-125% of the average productivity of the EU27), or a level even 
higher than the average level of labour productivity and these are mainly the 
areas of capital cities (e.g. Prague, Bratislava, Bucharest, Sofia).
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Map 4.3. Regional labour productivity expressed in relation to the EU27 aver-
age (EU27=100), 2008.
A significantly higher level of labour productivity is represented by West-
ern and northern parts of the analysed regions which belong to the former EU15 
countries, although even among these regions there is certain variation. A sig-
nificantly lower level of productivity (50-75% of the EU27 average) is present 
in the westernmost regions of Europe, especially in northern and Western parts 
5150
Rubén Camilo Lois González & Valerià Paül (editors)
of Great Britain, and Portugal. The remaining regions of the European countries 
represent a level similar to that of the EU27 average level of labour productivity. 
A detailed analysis of regional productivity presents itself as follows: Inner Lon-
don (302%) is at the head of the 10 regions with the highest labour productivity, 
more than three times the average of the EU27. Luxemburg (298.96%) has a 
slightly lower level of labour productivity. Then, there is the following order: 
Brussels, East Groningen, Hamburg, Paris, Bremen, Vienna and Prague. nor-
way is also included in this group. Therefore, the greatest labour efficiency is 
obtained in large cities and metropolises of continental and world level, which 
is confirmed by the fact, that cities play a fundamental role on the economic 
map of the world, as they are a source of economic growth, innovation, crea-
tivity and competitiveness (Parysek, 2005).
The improvement of productivity in lagging regions (mainly located in 
Eastern Europe) should come by increasing the level of technological pro-
gress and improving the quality of human capital, which are closely related 
factors. In this respect, it is evident that advances in competitiveness are quite 
dependent on the pillar of smart growth (innovation and education). However, 
technological progress may increase labour productivity, at the same its asso-
ciated reaction may be job losses. In this respect, there are complex relations 
between labour productivity and (un)employment.
4.5. General Government Gross Debt (Maastricht Debt)
A high level of government gross debt is an indicator of a poor financial 
condition of a given country and is usually considered a threat to its economic 
and social development. Government debt in EU is measured according to 
the Maastricht criterion. The Maastricht criterion stipulates that the debt-to-
GDP ratio in both member states and candidate countries cannot exceed 60% 
and the deficit-to-GDP ratio can be no higher than 3%. The analysis of those 
ratios allows comparing the performance of the member states and identifying 
countries failing in the struggle against the crisis and requiring appropriate 
actions to be taken to sustain their development in compliance with the 
EU2020S. The EU2020S itself does not focus on debt, but the reports aiming 
to assess the EU2020S fulfilment among countries (so-called Annual Growth 
Surveys) do contain a specific section devoted to debt, as this is understood to 
be a macro-economic condition with important effects and it is even consid-
ered a kind of “pre-requisite for growth”.
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Map 4.4. Public gross debt (Maastricht debt) represented as percentage of GDP, 
2011.
In 2011 the level of government debt varied from 5% to as much as 
165.80% of GDP across the EU countries (Map 4.4). It can be assumed that 
the countries in the South and West of the EU recorded a higher level of gov-
ernment debt than the countries in the north and East, including the newly 
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joined ones (Map 4.4). Estonia is the least debt-laden EU country, with Maas-
tricht debt at 5.8% of GDP. It is simultaneously the sole member state whose 
level of government debt is below 10% of GDP. In 2011 Estonia was followed 
by Bulgaria and Luxembourg with government debt ratios lower than 20% 
of GDP, and Romania, Sweden and Lithuania with the figures below 40% of 
GDP. The highest level of debt to GDP was recorded in Greece at over 165% 
of GDP. The state of Greece’s public finances is the worst in the EU. Slightly 
better off are Italy with 120.7% of GDP, Ireland (104.6% of GDP) and Portu-
gal (100.9% of GDP). In the rest of the EU countries the level of government 
debt was lower than GDP, but in Belgium, France, the United Kingdom and 
Germany it remained very high, standing above 80% of GDP. What makes the 
situation all the more alarming is that the highest debt to GDP ratio is recorded 
in highly economically developed countries, mostly the Eurozone members.
Many would agree with the opinion that budget balance cannot be treated 
as a mandatory and key criterion when evaluating the fiscal and economic 
situation of a country (Owsiak, 2006). But it must be remembered that cre-
ating a deficit and government debt as its consequence requires a great deal 
of prudence, and that the deficit amount should be well grounded in reality, 
justified by social and economic benefits and in consideration of the future 
burden for the budget (Kozioł, 2010). It is of utmost importance in a situation 
where sustainable growth, central to the concept of intergenerational equity, is 
one of the pillars of EU2020S.
4.6. Conclusions
Undoubtedly, the scale of the negative economic changes that have affected 
European regions for the last few years, including a clear economic slow-
down, as well as a drop in the level of consumption and level of affluence of 
the society, is an effect of the global banking and economic crisis that started 
in 2007 with the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the United States. The real eco-
nomic slump, a product of the financial market crisis, spread from the United 
States to many a part of the world. Its effects were particularly adverse for 
European countries. Stock exchange tumbles and falling property prices dra-
matically reduced the valuation of household assets, particularly in the most 
developed countries, which contributed to a major reduction in consumer 
spending. The financial crisis hampered businesses’ access to borrowing and 
increased its price, which had a particularly adverse effect on large companies 
using this form of funding. Falling property prices, in turn, led to a slump 
in the construction sector, the more severe, the stronger the earlier housing 
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construction boom. All the above contributed to increased unemployment and 
consequently worsened consumer moods, reflected in reduced consumption 
(Orłowski et al., 2010). Therefore, the causes of the crisis in European regions 
and entire countries may be traced back to both external (global) and internal 
factors (within the EU).
When analysing changes occurring on the global scene, particular attention 
is paid to the following (Socha et al., 2009): (1) dramatic changes in the balance 
of economic power in the world and the accompanying instability, (2) rapid 
globalisation processes, (3) rapid demographic changes, (4) rapid development 
of the derivatives market, (5) rapid development of financial markets, and (6) 
disastrous economic policy mistakes (especially of the US, but not only).
In terms of endogenous factors, the following are considered to be the 
main causes of the economic problems of European regions and countries 
(Orłowski, 2011): (1) demographics (the ageing Western European societies 
require new workers to sustain growth), (2) the problem of cultural identity 
and limited capacity to absorb immigrants into the society, (3) the attachment 
of citizens to the idea of the great welfare state, ensuring a level of social 
security unseen in other parts of the world, (4) troubles in the Eurozone, an 
effect of inability to cooperate effectively or act together, and (5) the inability 
to remain competitive and sustain a satisfying level of economic growth.
At the same time, it is stressed that Europe was not able to cope with 
globalisation or fully take advantage of the mechanisms of economic growth 
based on knowledge and intensive use of human capital, which made it the 
continent with the lowest growth rate, losing its position to new superpowers 
emerging in Asia (Orłowski, 2011; OECD, 2003). Some researchers believe 
that one of the causes of the crisis in the EU was paradoxically its enlarge-
ment, which made the club a far less homogenous aggregate of states and 
problems, whose political energy was from then on focused on ensuring just 
any cohesion (Kuźniar, 2011). Also a paradox, the crisis affected most strong-
ly the countries of the old fifteen members (EU15), which make up the core 
of the monetary union (the Eurozone). According to some authors, one of 
the most important problems of the Eurozone is a misconceived institutional 
system (Arestis and Sawyer, 2011; Grosse 2011). One of its features is the 
centralisation of the monetary policy on the union level, with the decentrali-
sation of fiscal policy on the level of member states (Grosse, 2011; Oręziak, 
2009; Dyson 2008). The EU lacks proper financial instruments to allow for 
structural changes in the Eurozone economy on the one hand and to react to 
critical situations in the individual Eurozone countries on the other. It is also 
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pointed out that the joint monetary policy in the Eurozone increases the differ-
ences between fiscal policies, which are the basic instrument for spurring the 
economy. This diversity is additionally an effect of differences in the social 
and economic institutions in place in each country and in the phases of the 
business cycle (Grosse, 2011).
In any case, today’s Europe, especially Western Europe, has had a rather 
rough experience with the effects of the crisis and is anything but an economic 
and social paradise. Still, in many areas it remains a power able to compete for 
a leading position in the world. To overcome the current, unfavourable trends 
it needs both decisive action and self-confidence (Orłowski, 2011).
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